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The recent trial of Brain for the murder of Captain Nash in July,
1896, was one of the most remarkable 'criminal trials in our history,
involving questions that no court ever had to deal with before. The
reversal by the Supreme Court (18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 183) of his convic-
tion below was perhaps not unexpected by many members of the bar
who followed the course of the trial. But it was generally thought
that the reversal would be on other grounds. The ground was that
a certain confession obtained from Brain at Halifax was not volun-
tary afid hence not admissible. Power, a police officer at Halifax,
had Brain brought into his private office and then examined him
alone, having first stripped him of his clothing, but making no
threats nor offering any inducements to him. Power said to him,
"Brain, we are trying to unravel this horrible mystery. Your posi-
tion is rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office and
he made a statement that he saw you do the murder." Brain said,
"He could not have seen me. Where was he?" "He states he was
at the wheel." "Well, he could not see me from there." "Now,
look here, Brain. I am satisfied that you killed the captain, from all I
have heard from Mr. Brown. But some of us here think you could
not have done all that crime alone. If you had an accomplice, you
should say so, aud not have the blame of this horrible crime on your
own shoulders." "Well, I think, and many others on board the ship
think, that Brown is the murderer; but I don't know anything about
it."
This conversation was offered only as a confession and hence, in de-
termining its admissibility, it is not necessary to consider the measure
of proof resulting from it. The protection against the admission of
voluntary confessions is contained in the Fifth Amendment, that no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." But what amount of proof is necessary to show an
involuntary state of mind from the operation of hope or fear must
depend in each case on its peculiar circumstances. Analogy and
similarity are of little help here. "The rule is not that, in order to
reider a statement admissible, the proof must be adequate to estab-
lish that the particular communications contained in a statement were
voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to establish that the i±ak-
ing of the statement was voluntary-that is to say, that, from causes
which the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of
the accused hope or fear in respect to the crime charged, the accused
was not involuntarily impelled to make a statement when but for the
improper influences he would have remained silent." All the leading
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cases, English and American, on what words are sufficient to consti-
tute an inducement and thus render the confession involuntary, are
reviewed. The majority of the court then held that "the situation of
the accused, and the nature of the communication made to him by the
detective, necessarily overthrow any possible implication that his re-
ply to the detective could have been the result of a purely voluntary
mental action; that the result was to produce upon his mind the fear
that, if he remained silent, it would be considered an admission of
guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as
the guilty person; and it cannot be conceived that the converse
impression would not also have naturally arisen that, by denying,
there was hope of removing the suspicion from himself. * * * To
communicate to a person suspected of the commission of crime the
fact that his co-suspect has stated that he has seen him commit the
offense, to make this statement to him under circumstances which
call imperatively for an admission or denial, and to accompany the com-
munication with conduct which necessarily perturbs the mind and
engenders confusion of thought, and then to use the denial made by
the person so situated as a confession, because of the form in which
the denial is made, is not only to compel the reply, but to produce
the confusion of words supposed to be found in it, and then use state-
ments thus brought into being for the conviction of the accused."
The brief dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in which Mr.
Justice Brown and the Chief-Justice concur, is very strong and
forcible and will carry conviction to many minds. But as the ques-
tion is so largely one of fact and the decision must rest on the pecu-
liar circumstances of the case, it illustrates only how differently the
same circumstances will be interpreted by different persons.
Since international expositions are not events of common occur-
rence, rarely taking place with greater frequency than once in a gen-
eration, any case involving the rules and care necessary in the man-
agement of such affairs must be of interest. On account of the near
proximity of the Paris E3Eposition in i9oo the case of the French Re-
public et al. v. World's Columbian JExOsition, 83 Fed. Rep. lO9, is
worthy of notice. The facts were very simple-the French exhibits
injured being in the Manufactures Building, which had a wooden
sidewalk upon its roof. This walk rendered the roof much more
inflammable; it was offset, however, by water iu a standpipe, kept
under pressure by means of pumps. After the close of the Fair, and
before the exhibitors had had time to remove their goods, they
were injured by sparks and brands from the burning sidewalk on
the roof, such burning being due to the lack of water under
pressure in the standpipe. The director general had issued
notices that the management would take all due precautions, but
would be in no way responsible for loss, from whatever cause
occurring. While the characteristics of bailment apply in some
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respect to the relations of exhibitors and those managing the exposi-
tion, still the exact relationship between them has never been hith-
erto judicially defined. The exhibits were of such a nature as to
render it impossible to replace many of them in case of their destruc-
tion. Therefore, the management was in no way excused from con-
tinuing its protection for such time after the close of the exposition
as to give the exhibitors a reasonable period in which to remove their
goods. The degree of care requisite was well set forth in judge
Grosscup's opinion: "The management of the Exposition was under
legal obligations to safeguard, by the highest intelligence and protec-
tion compatible with the ephemeral character of the buildings, the
exhibits of the plaintiffs, and such obligation is not escaped by the
exempting clauses contained in the reguTlations promulgated by the
director general."
